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Abstract
In this paper we embed the Almost Ideal Demand System within a dynamic disequi-
librium model, and derive a set of interrelated Euler equations which characterizes
optimal consumption allocations under adjustment costs. It is argued that when
applied to alcohol and tobacco expenditure, the proposed specification features the
rational addiction hypothesis, as both forward-looking rational behaviour and habit
formation are explicitly accounted for. The suggested estimation approach controls
for potential nonstationarity in the underlying time-series. Results relative to UK
tobacco and alcohol demand support the adopted specifications and highlight the
degree of complementarity between addictive goods.
1 A previous version of this paper circulated with the title: ’Back to the Future?
Habits and Rational Addiction in UK Tobacco and Alcohol Demand’.
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Rational Addiction, Cointegration and
Tobacco and Alcohol Demand
Abstract
In this paper we embed the Almost Ideal Demand System within a dynamic dis-
equilibrium model, and derive a set of interrelated Euler equations which char-
acterizes optimal consumption allocations under adjustment costs. It is argued
that when applied to alcohol and tobacco expenditure, the proposed specifica-
tion features the rational addiction hypothesis, as both forward-looking rational
behaviour and habit formation are explicitly accounted for. The suggested esti-
mation approach controls for potential nonstationarity in the underlying time-
series. Results relative to UK tobacco and alcohol demand support the adopted
specifications and highlight the degree of complementarity between addictive
goods.
1 Introduction
Rational addiction as defined by Becker and Murphy (1988) implies that con-
sumption of addictive goods with negative health implications is still consistent
with forward-looking maximization of utility from stable preferences. Addic-
tion is rational in the sense that the consumer goes beyond the pure myopic
behavior (habit persistence and reinforcement from past consumption), and
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anticipates the consequences of future consumption. This theory has allowed
economists to treat demand for addictive goods, previously disregarded as
irrational, and has been tested fairly successfully on alcohol and tobacco con-
sumption. More recently, the rational addiction hypothesis has been tested
on other goods than those commonly recognized as addictive, especially in
relation to obesity and demand for unhealthy foods (Richards and Patterson,
2006). Empirical tests of the theory involve the estimation of demand models
which allow for a response of demand to past levels of consumption and cur-
rent and future prices (Becker, Grossman and Murphy, 1994; Chaloupka, 1991;
Grossman and Chaloupka, 1998; Baltagi and Griﬃn, 2001). While some au-
thors (Suranovic et al., 1999) have objected that such forward-looking behavior
ignores future health adverse consequences, the persistence of unhealthy be-
haviors has been justified with adjustment and withdrawal costs that prevent
consumers to switch to a healthier consumption bundle (Jones, 1999).
As argued in Decker and Schwartz (2000), understanding the connections be-
tween the consumption of more than one addictive good (e.g. cigarettes and
alcohol) and incorporating their interrelationship into econometric consump-
tion analyses is important for two reasons. First, if the two consumption goods
are substitutes (or complements), then correctly specified consumption goods
equations must include also the price of the other good and relevant policy
variables as well. Second, a given policy might exert “cross” eﬀect on the other
market, hence the specification of such cross eﬀect may provide useful policy
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guidance.
The rational addiction hypothesis is based on two fundamental assumptions:
(i) forward-looking rational behavior, and (ii) habit formation. If it is hard to
argue with the notion that cigarette and alcohol consumption is not subject
to habit formation, a crucial point is whether consumers are forward-looking
and take all the risks associated with addictive goods into consideration when
making their choices.
In this paper we propose an approach to the joint modelling of alcohol and
tobacco consumption expenditure which allows to capture (i) and (ii) above,
and answer a number of questions which are of key importance for both fiscal
and social policy: First, do habits play a role in the aggregate demand for
alcohol and tobacco? Second, are alcohol and tobacco consumers forward-
looking ? Third, are there significant interactions between expenditure on
alcoholic drinks and tobacco expenditure?
To achieve this task, we embed Deaton and Muellbauer ’s (1980) Almost
Ideal Demand System (AIDS) within a dynamic disequilibrium model where
consumers’ behavior is governed by a system of Euler equations which char-
acterizes optimal forward-looking allocations under adjustment costs. As the
implied model captures both forward-looking behavior and habit formation,
it features the rational addiction hypothesis. Although the rational habit hy-
pothesis and forward-looking behavior have been explicitly introduced within
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an AIDS modeling framework in Alessie and Kapteyn (1991), Andrikopou-
los et al. (1997), Weissemberg (1986) and Rossi (1987), to our knowledge no
existing study relates the proposed specification to the joint modeling of con-
sumption of addictive goods. Moreover, compared to Jones (1989) and Weis-
semberg (1986), the suggested specification embodies a more involved dynamic
structure, as we detail in the paper.
On the econometric side, the estimable model which stems from our specifica-
tion reads as an error-correcting system involving both forward and backward-
looking behavior. The estimation approach we propose controls for potential
nonstationarity in the underlying time-series. More specifically, we propose
a simple two-stage procedure, where cointegration techniques are applied in
the first stage to obtain consistent estimates of the static (long-run) parame-
ters in the AIDS relationship.1 Having fixed the parameters of the AIDS at
their super-consistent estimates, in the second stage Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) techniques are implemented to obtain the parameters gov-
erning the system of interrelated Euler equations. Any existing econometric
package can be used to implement the proposed method.
Our application investigates aggregate consumption of alcoholic beverages and
tobacco in the UK over the 1963-2003 period, using quarterly data. Accounting
for interaction between alcohol and tobacco demand through a systemwise ap-
proach is not a trivial extension, since it is acknowledged that the cross-price
eﬀect in alcohol and tobacco demand might be quite relevant and comple-
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mentarity between the two goods is a likely outcome (Decker and Schwartz,
2000).
Obviously, the estimation of models which embody the rational addiction hy-
pothesis based on aggregate data, poses formidable challenges. In general, it
is not clear whether all the necessary aggregation conditions are met when
dealing with alcohol and tobacco expenditure. The use of aggregate data may
blur the fact that decisions on tobacco and alcohol consumption at any point
in time are the result of a complex flow among individuals who start and quit.
Furthermore, as it is well known, aggregate price data often significantly un-
derestimate the amount of price variation experienced by individuals at the
local level. However, there is a strand of literature, to which this paper is
related, where the empirical investigation of addictive consumption goods is
tackled successfully by means of aggregate data, see, inter alia, Jones (1989),
Goel and Morey (1995), Olekalns and Bardsley (1996), Bask and Melkersson
(2003, 2004), Duﬀy (2002, 2003) and Richards and Patterson (2006).Our re-
sults show that despite the above mentioned diﬃculties, a number of issues on
tobacco and alcohol expenditure can be investigated empirically, and policy
questions addressed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, disentangling
the long run specification (Section 2.1) from the disequilibrium adjustment
dynamics (2.2). Section 3 discusses the estimation procedure, and Section 4
provides the empirical analysis based on quarterly UK alcohol and tobacco
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data. Section 5 draws some conclusions.
2 The model
We consider a representative consumer who undertakes a two-stage decision
process. In the first stage he decides the optimal (target) expenditure allo-
cation across the diﬀerent goods. In the second stage this target behavior is
embedded into a quadratic cost of adjustment-disequilibrium framework.
2.1 Long-run equilibrium
The target level of consumption is assumed to follow the linear approximation
of the static and flexible AIDS model of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). This
implies that the long-run equilibrium is free from habits and expectations and
reflects the Marshallian demand function derived from an utility-maximizing
consumer with a price-independent generalized logarithmic (PIGLOG) expen-
diture function. The equilibrium relationship is given by the following system
of demand equations:
w∗it = γi0 +
nP
j=1
γij logPjt + λi log
µYt
Pt
¶
+ δit (1)
i = 1, ..., n , t = 1, ...T
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where n is the number of goods, w∗it is the aggregate target level for the i-th
expenditure share as predicted by consumer theory,
wit = (PitQit/
nP
j=1
PjtQjt) = (PitQit/Yt)
is the actual expenditure share for good i at time t, Pjt is the price of good
j at time t, Qit is the quantity of good i purchased at time t, Yt is the total
expenditure at time t and the non-linear price index Pt can be adequately
approximated by the Stone index logP ∗t =
nP
h=1
wkt logPht. A linear trend with
coeﬃcient δi was included in the model to capture systematic trends (e.g.
smooth structural changes) in demand patterns.
System (1) is linear in the preference parameters γi0, γij and λi and is obtained
under the assumption of intertemporal separability. In order to respect the
underlying theoretical assumptions, the following restrictions must hold in
(1):
nP
i=1
γi0 = 1,
nP
i=1
γij = 0,
nP
i=1
λi = 0,
nP
i=1
δi = 0 (2)
nP
j=1
γij = 0 (3)
γij = γji. (4)
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These constraints represent respectively the adding up, homogeneity and sym-
metry assumptions from microeconomic theory. Given (2) the demand system
is singular by construction. In order to avoid the related econometric problems,
the usual procedure consists in dropping one equation from the system2.
Following Ng (1995) and using some algebra the model can be parameterized
as
w∗it =
n−1P
j=1
γij log
µPjt
Pnt
¶
+ γhi log(Pnt) + λi log
µYt
Pt
¶
+ γi0 + δit (5)
where γhi =
nP
j=1
γij and equilibrium expenditure shares are expressed in terms
of relative prices and real total expenditure. The advantage of this formulation
is that the homogeneity constraint (3) here corresponds to the restriction
γhi = 0. For the rest of the discussion we rewrite compactly (5) as:
w∗t = Γzt + γ + δt (6)
where w∗t = (w∗1t, ..., w∗mt)0, m = n − 1, zt = (p1t, ..., pmt, pm+1t, yt)0, pjt =
log (Pjt/Pnt), j = 1, ...,m, pnt = log (Pnt), yt = ln (Yt/ktPt), Γ = [γij
... γni
... λi],
i = 1, ...,m, j = 1, ...,m− 1 is a m× (m+ 2) matrix and γ = (γ10, ..., γm,0)0,
δ = (δ1, ..., δm)0 are m× 1 vectors.
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2.2 Dynamic disequilibrium model
System (6) defines the baseline AIDS share equations. However, a number of
modifications are desirable before model (6) can be applied to data on alcohol
and tobacco expenditure, as argued in Jones (1989).
FollowingWeissemberger (1986), we posit that consumers are generally unable
to achieve equilibrium in each time period, due to habit persistence, and the
costs of adjusting the consumption bundle to meet future expectations. Let
ewt+j = w∗t+j + et+j, where w∗t+j corresponds to the equilibrium expenditure
share (6), and et+j is anm×1 error term which captures stochastic deviations
from the static AIDS.
In each time period, the representative consumer solves the following cost-
minimization problem
min
{wt+j}
Et
∞X
j=0
ρj[(wt+j − ewt+j)0D0(wt+j − ewt+j) + (7)
+∆wt+j 0D1∆wt+j +∆2wt+j 0D2∆2wt+j]
where wt, wt−1 and wt−2 are given at time t. In (7) Et· = E(· | Ωt) is the
expectation operator conditional on the information set available at time t,
Ωt−1 ⊆ Ωt, ∆wt = wt − wt−1, ∆2wt = ∆wt −∆wt−1, ρ (0 < ρ < 1) is a time-
invariant discount factor and D0, D1 and D2 are m ×m symmetric positive
definite matrices. It is assumed that {wt, wt−1, ... zt, zt−1, ... et, et−1...} ⊆ Ωt
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and that Etet+j = 0 for j ≥ 1.
The first addendum in (7) measures the cost of not attaining the long run
target w∗t+j, i.e. disequilibrium costs and the second and third addenda mea-
sure respectively the costs of changing wt and ∆wt. In the rational addiction
context, the dis-utility of adverse health consequences from consumption is ac-
counted for in the first addendum, while the costs of adjustment (withdrawal)
discussed by Jones (1999) are modelled in the remaining two terms.
If D0, D1 and D2 are specified as non-diagonal matrices, cross-adjustment
and cross-disequilibria costs arise. It is worth noting that diﬀerently from
Weissemberger (1986), it is assumed that adjustment costs in (7) originate
from quarterly rather than yearly changes in consumption allocations. This
choice is motivated by the nature of consumption decisions we investigate
in Section 4. It is reasonable to assume, indeed, that alcohol and tobacco
consumers process new information more than only once a year.
The first-order necessary conditions to solve (7) are given by the system of
(second-order) interrelated Euler equations (Fanelli, 2006)
ρ2D2Et∆2wt+2−ρ[D1+2D2]Et∆wt+1+[D1+2ρD2]∆wt+D2∆2wt+D0(wt− ewt) = 0m×1.
(8)
Using (6) and simple algebra, the Euler equations can be written as the
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expectations-based error-correcting model
Et∆wt+2 = ρ−1Ψ1Et∆wt+1−ρ−2Ψ2∆wt−ρ−2∆wt−1−ρ−2Υ(wt−Γzt−γ−δt)+ϕt
(9)
where Ψ1 = [Ψ+ (2 + ρ)Im], Ψ2 = [Ψ+ 2ρIm], Ψ = D−12 D1, Υ = D−12 D0 and
ϕt = ρ−2Υet. The matrices Ψ1, Ψ2 and Υ in (9) need not to be symmetric,
and the term (wt−w∗t ) = (wt−Γzt−γ−δt) is the vector of expenditure share
disequilibria, i.e. deviations of actual expenditure shares from the equilibrium
levels that would prevail in the absence of frictions.
System (9) can be further manipulated in the form
∆wt = ρΨ−12 Ψ1Et∆wt+1−ρ2Ψ−12 Et∆wt+2−Ψ−12 Υ(wt−Γzt−γ−δt)+Ψ−12 ∆wt−1+ϕ∗t
(10)
where ϕ∗t = ρ2Ψ−12 ϕt. This formulation shows that the expenditure shares
at time t depend on: (i) expected changes in expenditure shares one and
two periods (quarters) ahead (forward-looking behavior); (ii) deviations of
actual expenditure shares from equilibrium levels (disequilibria); (iii) changes
in lagged expenditure shares (myopic habit persistence).
As Ψ1, Ψ2 and Υ are generally not diagonal, the pattern of expenditure shares
for the i-th good depends on its own dynamics as well as on the dynamics
of all goods in the system. In particular, the Υ matrix contains the own and
cross-adjustment coeﬃcients, i.e. the parameters in each row measure how ex-
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penditure shares react to the own disequilibrium as well as to the disequilibria
involving the other goods. For simplicity, considering the case m = 2 (a three
demand system n = 3 with m = n− 1 = 2 two modelled expenditure shares);
then the Υ matrix is given by
Υ =


ω11 ω12
ω21 ω22


where e.g. the structural parameter ω11 measures how ∆w1t, react to the
own two periods lagged disequilibrium (w1t−2 −w∗1t−2), whereas ω12 indicates
whether ∆w1t react to the two periods lagged disequilibrium (w2t−2 − w∗2t−2)
characterizing the other expenditure share.
Apparently, the specified system seems to neglect a role to expected future
prices and total expenditure. Actually, by solving the model (9) forward, it
can be shown that the system is consistent with a dynamic specification where
consumers react to lagged disequilibria and future expected changes of prices
and total expenditure. To see this without going too much into technical de-
tails, we focus on the case where the D2 matrix in (7) is zero, i.e. when con-
sumers face first-order adjustment costs only. When D2 = 0m×m model (9)
collapses to the system of (first-order) interrelated Euler equations
∆wt = ρEt∆wt+1 −Π(wt − Γzt − γ − δt) + ξt (11)
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where Π = D−11 D0 and ξt = Πet. By imposing a suitable transversality condi-
tion, (11) can be solved forward and manipulated to yield the optimal error-
correcting decision rule (Fanelli, 2006b)
∆wt = (Im−Λ)(wt−1−Γzt−1− eγ−δt)+ ∞X
j=0
(ρΛ)j(Im−Λ)ΓEt∆zt+j+ ζt (12)
where Λ is a m ×m matrix whose elements are opportunely related to that
of Π in (11), ζt = (Im − ρΛ) (Im − Λ)et and eγ = γ + δ. It is evident that
changes in expenditure shares in (12) depends on the lagged disequilibria and
expectations on future expenditure shares, prices and expenditure levels. This
model represents a process of “rational” habit formation, as the consumer
depicted by (12) is forward as well as backward-looking.
Two further points about the specification outlined in this section should be
noticed. First, model (9) embodies both the hypotheses of forward-looking
behavior and convex adjustment costs, therefore it results in a tight dynamic
structure.3 Second, Heien and Durham (1991) argue that the habit eﬀects
modelled through lagged dependent variables are likely to be overstated when
aggregate time-series data are used, as information about consumers hetero-
geneity is ignored in aggregated time series data and omitted variables result
in higher residual autocorrelation, ultimately and incorrectly captured by the
habit eﬀect. This is also part of the usual aggregation argument, as individual
behaviors are not necessarily reflected in aggregate models. Although this is
certainly true, as most of the empirical research and policy analysis is based on
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aggregated time series data, it is certainly desirable to conduct a specification
search to improve habit formation and rational addiction modeling.
3 Estimation procedure
The unrestricted parameters of the system of Euler equations (9) are contained
in (Γ, γ, δ, ρ, Ψ, Υ). In particular, (Γ, γ, δ) refers to the long-run AIDS, and
(ρ, Ψ, Υ) to the dynamic adjustment structure. We propose a simple two-step
procedure for estimating model (9), which hinges on the super-consistency
result guaranteed by the presence of non-stationary cointegrated variables,
see Phillips (1991) and Johansen (1991).
First step
We assume that wt and zt are I(1) and cointegrated such that the term dt =
(wt − Γzt − γ − δt) is I(0). Under these assumptions, the eﬃcient estimation
of (Γ, γ, δ) can be carried out through cointegration methods. Tests of the
hypotheses of homogeneity and symmetry involve the elements in Γ and are
characterized by chi-squared distributions.4
The recent literature on the cointegrated AIDS model can be split into two
main research flows according to the estimation method. The first bulk of
works stems from Ng (1995) and Attfield (1997)5, who adopt a triangular
vector error correction (TVEC) representation of the demand system and im-
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plement Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS), see e.g. Stock and Wat-
son (1993). The alternative modelling procedure is the Johansen (1996) full
information maximum likelihood (FIML) technique, based on a Vector Error
Correction (VEC) representation of the demand system as in e.g. Ben Kaabia
and Gil (2001). In comparing empirically the two approaches, Fanelli and Maz-
zocchi (2002) show that the VEC has the advantage of providing a “natural”
framework for testing (and framing) some of the hypotheses underlying the
cointegrated AIDS, such as the exogeneity of prices and total expenditure.
Second step: GMM
Once the matrix Γ, which contains the AIDS preference parameters, is replaced
with its super (order T ) consistent maximum likelihood (ML) estimates ob-
tained in the first step, the estimation of system (9) can be accomplished
either through ML or GMM. Estimation through a VAR-based ML approach
is discussed in Fanelli (2006a) for the case ϕt = 0 (“exact” model), and in
Binder and Pesaran (1995) for the more technically involved case ϕt 6= 0 (“in-
exact” model). Below we focus on the GMM approach, given its computational
simplicity compared to “full-information” methods.
Using the decomposition ∆wt+2 = Et∆wt+2 + ηt+2, where the rational expec-
tations forecast error ηt is such that Etηt+2 = 0 and Etηt+1 = 0, by lagging
the model by two time periods, system (9) can be rewritten as
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∆wt = ρ−1Ψ1∆wt−1 − ρ−2Ψ2∆wt−2 − ρ−2∆wt−3 − ρ−2Υ bdt−2 + ut (13)
where ut = ηt − ρ−1Ψ1ηt−1 + ϕt−2 and bdt = (wt − bΓzt − bγ − bδt) is the esti-
mated disequilibria term obtained in the first-step. The matrices Ψ1 and Ψ2
are restricted as in (9).
Under the above hypotheses on the order of integration of variables, the model
(13) involves stationary variables and reads as an error-correcting system,
non-linear in the parameters. The substitution of the “true” disequilibria dt =
(wt − Γzt − γ − δt) with the estimated bdt does not aﬀect the asymptotics
(order
√
T ) of the estimators of (ρ, Ψ, Υ), due to the above mentioned super-
consistency result.
It is assumed that the rational expectations forecast error ηt and the distur-
bance et are homoskedastic, and E(ηte0t) 6= 0m×m, implying that E(ηtϕ0t) 6=
0m×m. In this case, the disturbance term ut in (13) follows a MA(2)-type
process, hence it holds the condition
E(ut | Ωt−3) = 0m×1. (14)
The orthogonality conditions in (14) represent the basis for the GMM estima-
tion of (13). Let θ = (ρ, vec(Ψ)0, vec(Υ)0)0 be the a× 1 (a = 1 + 2m2) vector
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containing the unrestricted parameters of (13), and θ0 the “true” value of θ.
From (14) it turns out that for any (stationary) vector st of dimension q × 1
such that st ∈ Ωt−3 (i.e. for any vector containing variables dated t − 3 and
earlier) and mq ≥ a,
E [ht(θ0)] = 0mq×1 (15)
where ht(θ0) = ut(θ0) ⊗ st and ut(θ) denotes the vector of disturbances of
(13).6 The orthogonality conditions (15) can be employed to form a GMM
estimator of θ by choosing bθT as the solution to
min
θ
hT (θ)0 WT hT (θ)
where hT (θ) = 1T
PT
t=1 ht(θ) is the mq × 1 vector of sample moments and WT
is the weighting matrix. An optimal GMM estimator can be computed by em-
ploying an heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimator
of the covariance matrix, as in Andrews (1991) or Newey and West (1994).7
The over-identifying restrictions test statistic, JT = T hT (bθ)0 cWT hT (bθ), is χ2
distributed with mq − a degrees of freedom.
The system of Euler equations (13) is linear in parameters aside from the
discount factor ρ. However, as it is generally diﬃcult to estimate the discount
factor within the class of forward-looking models we consider here, we adopt
a grid search for ρ, fixing a set of economic plausible values and then selecting
the one which minimized the GMM objective function.8
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4 Results
The empirical analysis is based on a time series of T=161 quarterly obser-
vations of UK consumer expenditure on alcoholic beverage and tobacco over
the period 1963:1 to 2003:1. All data are freely supplied on-line by the UK
Oﬃce for National Statistics (www.statistics.gov.uk). Data on aggregate UK
household consumer expenditure on alcoholic beverages are based on volume
of sales and average prices of individual types of alcoholic beverages for “oﬀ-
licence” trades. This information is obtained from a continuous survey of retail
outlets. Estimates for tobacco are based on data obtained from Her Majesty’s
Customs & Excise (HMCE) relating to the quantities of tobacco released for
sale within the UK. Quarterly household aggregated expenditure is obtained
from several independent sources, including the Retail Sales Inquiry and the
Expenditure and Food Survey (which merges the previous Family Expendi-
ture Survey and the National Food Survey). Prices series are the Retail Price
Index (RPI) for alcoholic beverages, tobacco and the all-item RPI. Prices and
expenditure time series were scaled to be 1 at the mean point to reduce the
bias from the Stone Index approximation.
The system includes two expenditure share equations, respectively for alco-
holic beverages (w1t) and tobacco (w2t), while a numeraire equation (w3t) for
all remaining goods was dropped from estimation to overcome the singularity
problem (
P3
i=1wit = 1); hence m = n − 1 = 3 − 1 = 2. The information
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required to estimate the system is completed by the prices of alcoholic bever-
ages, tobacco and all other goods p1t, p2t and p3t and total expenditure yt, after
deflation through the Stone index. Prices and total expenditure are collected
in the vector zt = (p1t, p2t, p3t, yt)0.
Figure 1 shows the overall trend in alcohol and tobacco consumption (real
expenditure at 1995 prices) over the sample period and the expenditure shares
w1t andw2t. UK household consumption of alcohol has risen at a fairly constant
rate, even if the expenditure share does not show the same trend due to the
aggregate expenditure increase. The fall in tobacco consumption, especially
from the 1980s, is evident from both the real expenditure and expenditure
share graphs.
The first-step of our procedure starts with the estimation of the cointegrated
AIDS (6). We used a VEC for Xt = (w1t, w2t, z0t)0 and the Johansen method
(Johansen, 1996). The VEC included a liner trend restricted to the cointe-
gration space, and three centered seasonal dummies to capture deterministic
seasonal patterns characterizing expenditure shares. The lag length was fixed
at 5 as suggested by standard information criteria (AIC, SC, HQ), and resid-
uals diagnostic tests.9
Before computing the Johansen Trace test for cointegration rank, we exam-
ined the roots of the characteristic polynomial associated with the VEC. The
eigenvalues of the companion matrix associated with the VEC suggest the
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presence of unit roots at the long run frequency (as expected).10 The Trace
test is reported in Table 1 and indicates the presence of four unit roots in
the six-dimensional system Xt, corresponding to two cointegrating relations.
Given the cointegration rank r = m = 2, the FIML estimates of the preference
parameters (Γ, γ, δ), are reported in Table 2.
The symmetry and homogeneity constraints characterizing the elements in the
Γmatrix were tested through a likelihood ratio (LR) statistic and not rejected.
This is an encouraging results, in contrast with many applied studies, which
could reflect a specification improvement. The weak and strong exogeneity of
prices and total expenditure with respect to the structural parameters of the
AIDS were sharply rejected.11 The long-run relationships also show a negative
and significant trend for both products, a shift of preferences away from the
two addictive goods possibly due to increased information and health concerns.
Table 3 reports the estimates of the long-run Marshallian elasticities for the
homogeneity and symmetry constrained system. Some results are striking, al-
beit plausible and consistent with previous studies. Demand for alcohol in the
UK is quite price-elastic (-1.23) and there is clear evidence of complemen-
tarity between alcohol and tobacco consumption, as in the study by Jones
(1999) for the UK and Decker and Schwartz (2000) on US individual data.
In the long-run, there is also a very high expenditure elasticity, which con-
trasts the negative trend observed in preferences, as increasing incomes lead
to higher consumption. Duﬀy (2003) also finds some complementarity between
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tobacco and spirits and a high expenditure elasticity for spirits. However, his
higher level of disaggregation allows to distinguish across alcoholic beverages,
and beer and wine are found to be substitutes of tobacco. For tobacco con-
sumption, our results diﬀer from Duﬀy (2003), as the Marshallian long-run
own-price and expenditure elasticities are non-significant, showing a consumer
whose long-run consumption equilibrium is independent from the traditional
economic factors. Habits and addiction are the main determinants of changes
in consumption levels.
After replacing the preference parameters of the AIDS (Γ, γ, δ) with the es-
timates of Table 1, we next moved to the second-step estimation procedure.
The reference model is the system of interrelated Euler equations (13). De-
tails of the econometric specification are as follows. For GMM estimation, the
set of stationary instruments was st = (∆4w1t−3, ∆4w2t−3, ∆p1t−3, ∆p2t−3,
∆p3t−3, ∆w1t−4, ∆w2t−4, ∆p1t−4, ∆p2t−4, ∆p3t−4, ∆yt−4, ∆w2t−5)0 where for
a given (logged) variable, vt, ∆4vt = vt − vt−4 = (1 − L4)vt generates yearly
changes.12 It can be recognized that st belongs to the information set a time
t− 3 and earlier. The weight matrix was estimated through a HAC procedure
with Bartlett weights and Newey and West’s (1994) criterion for bandwidth.
From the selected grid, the values of the discount factor that minimizes the
GMM objective function is equal to 0.98, consistently with a quarterly average
real discount rate of 2% (i.e. a real yearly rate of about 8%).
GMM estimates are summarized in Table 4 along with the JT statistic for
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over-identifying restrictions, whereas in Table 5 we summarized Shea’s (1997)
measures of instrument relevance.13 It turns out that the partial correlation
among the right-hand side variables of system (13) and the list of instruments
selected for GMM estimation range from 30% to 53%which appears reasonable
for variables which are expressed in first diﬀerences (growth rates).
The estimates of Table 4 can be summarized in two important results. First,
the estimated interrelated dynamic structure of adjustment suggests both
backward and forward-looking behavior. Second, besides the complementarity
of alcohol and tobacco discussed above, a further relevant link emerges in the
consumption of these two additive good. Alcohol and tobacco adjust not only
to their own past disequilibria, but also to each other’s ones as suggested by
the estimated Υ matrix.
5 Conclusions
Understanding the role that uncertainty - other than risk aversion - plays in
determining consumption decisions of addictive goods has important policy
implications. Individuals often face significant price uncertainty about future
tax policies for such kind of goods. State governments sometimes try to change
behavior by announcing policies that may be implemented in the future. These
announcements may be eﬀective if the permanently change the beliefs that
individuals hold about future prices, whereas they may have modest eﬀects on
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individual and aggregate consumption if they are perceived to be temporary.
Tax policies thus not only aﬀect prices in the period that they are announced
and enacted, but also beliefs about future prices if they are perceived to be
credible and agents are forward-looking.
Our paper suggests a dynamic specification for the Almost Ideal Demand
System which is consistent with both backward and forward-looking behavior.
The proposed set-up has been used to model alcohol and tobacco decisions in a
joint dynamic framework, which admits an interpretation in terms of rational
addiction. Estimation is based on a two-step strategy, where cointegration
techniques are used for estimating the long run demand system that would
prevail in the absence of frictions, and GMM techniques for estimating the
implied interrelated system of adjustment towards equilibria.
The empirical application, based on a 40-years long time series of UK alco-
hol, tobacco and other goods expenditure supports the specification choice
and leads to four relevant results: (i) the joint backward and forward-looking
specification is consistent with the proposed application; (ii) the theoretical
restrictions of homogeneity and symmetry, often rejected in time series-based
AIDS models, are also valid within the adopted specification; (ii) exogeneity
of prices and total expenditure in the long-run relationship is strongly rejected
and the proposed method allows to account for endogeneity, overcoming a rel-
evant limit of most empirical applications; (iv) as few empirical studies have
investigated before, there is a strong complementarity between alcohol and
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tobacco consumption behavior, not only in terms of price reactions, but also
in adjusting to past cross-disequilibria.
Our study raises a couple of relevant theoretical and empirical issues which
still need to be addressed; first, one may wish to check for the impact on re-
sults of alternative cost-adjustment structures; and second, it may be diﬃcult
to generalize the results of an aggregate time-series study, as addictive behav-
ior are known to vary significantly across socio-demographic segments and a
panel data extension (as in Baltagi and Griﬃn, 1995) is desirable. The encour-
aging results of the proposed application suggest that dynamic issues deserve
a careful even if complex treatment when addictive goods are considered and
further study addressing the above limitations is desirable.
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Fig. 1. Trends in alcohol and tobacco aggregate consumption; UK quarterly data.
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Table 1
Johansen’s Trace test for cointegration rank based on the VEC with 5 lags, three
centered seasonal dummies and a restricted linear trend.
Number of unit roots Rank (r) Trace 5% c.v
6 0 125.2 114.9
5 1 90.9 89.9
4 2 59.7 62.6
3 3 32.7 42.2
2 4 13.4 24.4
1 5 4.7 12.4
Notes: 5% asymptotic critical values in the last column are taken from Table 15.4
in Johansen (1996).
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Table 2
Upper panel: FIML estimates of the parameters of the AIDS (7) with homogeneity
and symmetry imposed. Lower panel: Likelihood ratio (LR) tests for the hypotheses
of homogeneity and symmetry and on the weak and strong exogeneity of prices and
total expenditure.
Commodity p1t p2t p3t yt tr
w∗1t
(Alcohol)
-0.003
(-0.25)
-0.020
(-5.0)
0.024 0.054
(3.9)
-0.0003
(33.3)
w∗2t
(Tobacco)
-0.020
(-5.0)
0.039
(16.2)
-0.019 -0.039
(-6.5)
-0.0002
(-50.0)
LR: homogeneity and symmetry χ2(3)=2.45 [0.48]
LR: weak exogeneity of zt χ2(8)=40.20 [0.00]
LR: strong exogeneity of zt χ2(40)=82.77[0.00]
Notes: the cointegration rank is fixed at 2 consistently with the results in Table 1;
t-statistics in parentheses, p-values in square brackets.
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Table 3
Marshallian Long-Run Elasticities.
Elasticities
Commodity Alcohol Tobacco Other Goods Expenditure
w∗1t
(Alcohol)
-1.23
(0.42)
-1.16
(0.05)
1.21 3.80
(0.56)
w∗2t
(Tobacco)
-0.50
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.48 -0.01
(0.02)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4
GMM estimates of the parameters of the system of Euler equations (13) with JT
test for over-identifying restrictions.
GMM estimates of system (13)
ρ = 0.98
fixed
, bΨ1 =


1.48
(10.34)
1.03
(5.38)
−1.62
(−10.83)
−0.88
(−15.13)

 , bΨ2 =


0.46
(10.34)
1.03
(5.38)
−1.62
(−10.83)
−1.90
(−15.13)


bΥ =


−0.004
(−2.96)
−0.117
(−1.50)
−0.005
(−2.49)
−0.244
(−2.95)

 , JT = 12.57[0.70]
Alcohol equation: Tobacco equation:
R2 = 0.93 R2 = 0.63
s.e. =0.005 s.e. = 0.006
Note: the first row in the matrices bΨ1, bΨ2 and bΥ refers to the alcohol equation, and
the second row to the tobacco equation; the vector of instruments is st = (∆4w1t−3,
∆4w2t−3, ∆p1t−3, ∆p2t−3, ∆p3t−3,∆w1t−4, ∆w2t−4, ∆p1t−4, ∆p2t−4, ∆p3t−4, ∆yt−4,
∆w2t−5)0 and includes three deterministic seasonal dummies; t-statistics in paren-
theses; the p-value associated with the JT test is in square brackets and is computed
from a χ2 distribution with mq − a =16 degree of freedom, where m =2, q =15 is
the number of instruments in st (including the deterministic seasonal dummies),
and a = 14 is the number of free estimated parameters.
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Table 5
Shea’s (1997) R2p partial measures of instrument relevance, see footnote 17 for de-
tails.
Regressors of system (13) R2p
∆w1t−1 0.48
∆w2t−1 0.53
∆w1t−2 0.31
∆w2t−2 0.49bd1t−2 0.49bd2t−2 0.30
Notes: the vector of instruments is st = (∆4w1t−3,∆4w2t−3,∆p1t−3,∆p2t−3,∆p3t−3,
∆w1t−4, ∆w2t−4, ∆p1t−4, ∆p2t−4, ∆p3t−4, ∆yt−4, ∆w2t−5)0 and includes three de-
terministic seasonal dummies.
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Notes
1Starting with the work of Johnson et al. (1992), the error-correcting nature of
demand systems is perceived as a key feature when variables are non-stationary.
Cointegrated demand system have often proved consistent with the underlying the-
oretical restrictions, otherwise subject to frequent rejection (see Keuzenkamp and
Barten, 1995).
2As known, maximum likelihood estimates are invariant to the choice of the
equation to be dropped (see Barten, 1969).
3Quadratic costs can be restrictive, albeit mathematically convenient, therefore
rejection of the model should not be intended as a clear cut evidence against the
rational habit formation hypothesis as rational habit formation might still hold
under a diﬀerent dynamic structure.
4Phillips (1991) and Johansen (1991) discuss the theoretical conditions under
which eﬃcient estimators that belong to the locally asymptotically mixed normal
(LAMN) class can be obtained.
5See also Duﬀy (2002) for an application to alcohol demand.
6In principle, one can consider diﬀerent sets of instruments for the m equations
of the dynamic demand system.
7The estimation of model (13) through GMM leads to conventional questions
about instrument choice, and “weak identification” issues, which are well beyond
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the objectives of this paper; the interest reader is referred to Stock et al. (2002).
8Clearly, plausible values of ρ are close to (but less than) one. Most studies find
that variations in ρ do not significantly aﬀect estimates of the other parameters.
9Computations were performed through PcGive10.0 and E-Views 4.0.
10The eigenvalues of the companion matrix associated with the VAR suggest also
the possibility of unit roots at the seasonal frequency (Hylleberg et al., 1990). A
throughout time series analysis of the seasonal pattern of UK tobacco and alcohol
consumption goes beyond the purposes of the present paper. However, if the dy-
namics of the VEC is correctly specified, the possible presence of unit roots at the
seasonal frequencies does not pose any additional issues on the usual cointegration
tests at the zero frequency (Lee and Syklos, 1995), as well as on the estimation of
long run relationships (Johansen and Schaumburg, 1999).
11The “endogeneity” of total expenditure can be easily justified if one realizes that
(the antilog of) yt represents by construction the denominator of expenditure shares.
Observe that the violation of the weak exogeneity of zt implies that the eﬃcient
estimation of the AIDS through Dynamic OLS (DOLS) should be performed by
including a number of leads of ∆zt in addition to lags in the regression of wt on zt,
see Ng (1995) and Fanelli and Mazzocchi (2002).
12The filter (1 − L4) removes all unit roots characterizing vt at all frequencies.
Three centered seasonal dummies where included on the right hand side of (13)
(and in the instrument list) to account for deterministic seasonal patterns charac-
terizing the variables of the demand system. For the sake of simplicity, estimates of
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coeﬃcients associated with seasonal dummies are not reported in Table 3.
13In models with one explanatory variable, the R2 obtained from regressing the
endogenous (explanatory) variables on the instrument vector can be considered a
useful measure of instrument relevance. In multivariate models, however, one cannot
measure relevance by simply regressing each explanatory variable on the instrument
vector in turn; indeed, if instruments are highly collinear the R2 might result high
for each explanatory variable even when instruments are actually “weak”. Shea’s
(1997) simple method allows to compute, for each explanatory variable, partial R2
measures of instrument relevance, R2p , by correcting opportunely for the correla-
tion among instruments. Observe that in Table 5 we did not report partial R2p for
deterministic seasonal dummies.
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